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Abstract. This paper investigates the eect of network structure on the asset price
dynamics. We propose a simple present value discounted asset pricing model with
heterogeneous agents. Every period the agents choose a predictor of the future price
on the basis of past performance of their own and alternative strategies and form
their demands for a risky asset. The information about the performance of an alter-
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1native strategy is available only locally from the directly connected agents. Using
the rewiring procedure we produce four types of commonly considered networks:
a fully connected network, a regular lattice, a small world, and a random network.
The results show that the network structure inuences asset price dynamics in terms
of the region of stability and volatility. This is mostly due to the dierent speed of
information transmission in the dierent networks.
Keywords: asset pricing, local interactions, networks, small world, heterogeneous
beliefs, price dynamics.
JEL classication: C45, C62, C63, D84, G12.
21 Introduction
To a large extent innovative ideas and practices diuse in communities through in-
terpersonal communication. Popular ideas in nancial markets also often spread
through conversations (Shiller, 1995). In a survey of institutional investors in the
USA, Shiller and Pound (1989) found that money managers who invested in stocks
with extremely high growth of the price/earnings ratio were often discussing their
trades with colleagues. Arnswald (2001) found that among fund managers in Ger-
many information exchange with other nancial and industry experts was the second
most important factor inuencing their investment decisions, which complemented
conversations with their colleagues and reports from media. Similarly, a study of
fund managers by Hong et al. (2005) provided the strong support for the importance
of informal communication. Household investment decisions are also aected by in-
terpersonal communication. Madrian and Shea (2000) and Duo and Saez (2002)
showed that employees are more likely to join an investment retirement scheme if
their colleagues have done so. By reviewing data from the Health and Retirement
Study, Hong et al. (2004) suggested that interaction with neighbors or church at-
tendance increased the likelihood of a household investing in stocks.
We study the impact that local interactions between investors have on the asset
price dynamics. The innovation of our approach is to bring together ideas from three
streams of literature: the rapidly developing literature on networks, the literature
on heterogeneous agent models, and the literature on agent-based models. We ex-
plore a range of local interaction patterns by introducing dierent types of network
topologies into the stylized heterogeneous agent model of Brock and Hommes (1998).
We nd that not only communication inuences asset price dynamics, but also
the patterns of communication are important because they determine the speed of
information exchange. The analysis of the statistical properties of the time series
3shows that the model with a small world communication structure generates the
most realistic asset price dynamics among all other structures studied in this paper.
In the next section we survey heterogeneous beliefs models. The following section
examines dierent network structures and their properties. Section 4 contains the
description of the model and its application to the model of Brock and Hommes
(1998). In Section 5 we analyze the model, present and discuss the results of the
simulations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Bounded rationality and heterogeneity in asset pricing
The rational expectations theory of nance (Friedman, 1953) asserts that rational
investors would drive irrational traders out of the nancial markets. Numerous
empirical studies, however, showed that successful traders follow a variety of invest-
ment strategies (e.g. Frankel and Froot, 1987; Ito, 1990). DeLong et al. (1990) were
among the rst who analytically demonstrated that irrational noise traders may sur-
vive in the market with fully rational traders. The survival is possible because noise
traders bear higher risk which leads to higher returns in the long run. Moreover,
heterogeneity of expectations can explain asset prices dynamics. Day and Huang
(1990), Chiarella (1992), Kirman (1993) and Lux (1995) showed that trades between
dierent agents that follow simple behavioral rules lead to endogenous price uc-
tuations. Recently Alfarano and Milakovi c (2009) enriched the Kirman-Lux model
with explicit network structures.
Brock and Hommes (1998) and Hommes (2001) introduced a structural asset
pricing heterogeneous agent model (denoted the BH model henceforth) with an evo-
lutionary switching between several trading strategies. The strategies diered only
in the expectation about the future price of the risky asset. The tness measure
of each strategy was freely available to all the agents. The BH model showed that
4the rational expectations strategies do not necessarily drive out boundedly rational
strategies. In fact, both types can co-exist in a market. Despite its complexity, the
BH model had a closed-form analytical solution. The model was able to replicate ex-
cess volatility, a stylized fact which was not reproduced by the rational expectations
models.
To improve the realism of the BH model, Anufriev and Bottazzi (2004) intro-
duced heterogeneous investment horizons, while Anufriev and Panchenko (2006)
investigated the changes in the model outcomes due to dierent market architec-
tures. De Fontnouvelle (2000) enriched the model with various information ow
schemes about the dividend payments. Brock et al. (2005) extended the BH model
to many trader types, and Hommes (2002) modied the original BH model to repro-
duce volatility clustering. Hommes et al. (2005) included a market maker into the
market pricing mechanism, while Brock et al. (2006) studied how the presence of
risk hedging instruments in the form of Arrow securities aects the market dynam-
ics. Boswijk et al. (2007) estimated the parameters of the BH model using annual
US stock price data. Chang (2007) enriched the model with exogenous social in-
teractions of the Brock and Durlauf (2001) type. Diks and van der Weide (2005)
studied continuous distribution of the agent beliefs, while Gerasymchuk (2008) in-
troduced prospect theory-like preferences of the agents into a modied BH model.
For a detailed survey of the state of the art in the heterogeneous agent modeling see
Hommes (2006).
Another approach used in nancial market modeling relies on agent-based mod-
els. Agent-based models aim to re-create real stock markets with large populations
of interacting articial agents. Santa Fe articial stock market (Arthur et al., 1997;
LeBaron et al., 1999; Ehrentreich, 2006) is an example of such an approach. Other
examples of agent-based models include Gode and Sunder (1997), Chen and Yeh
(2001), Chen et al. (2001), and Duy (2001). A major advantage of these models
5over the heterogeneous agent models is that they allow for higher exibility, richer
behavioral assumptions, and more realistic market architectures. This comes at the
price of increased complexity. Closed form analytic solutions are typically not avail-
able for this class of models and computer simulations are used to analyze them.
For further details on agent-based modeling in nance we refer an interested reader
to the review by LeBaron (2006).
In this paper we combine the rapidly developing literature on networks with
the literature on heterogeneous agent models by introducing local interactions into
the stylized BH model. Due to high complexity of the resulting system, we lose
analytical tractability and have to use agent-based-type simulations to investigate
the model. Our aim is to study the eects of dierent types of local interactions on
the asset price dynamics. In our setting the information about the tness measure of
each particular strategy is available to the agents only locally through other agents
directly connected to them. We explore a range of local interactions patterns by
introducing dierent types of networks. The analytically tractable BH model is a
benchmark to which we compare our results.
3 Social networks
The analysis by Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Valente and Davis (1999) sug-
gested that a typical social network has the following features (summarized in Watts,
1999): 1) there are many participants in the network; 2) each participant is con-
nected to a small fraction of the entire network; in other words, the network is
sparse; 3) even the most connected node is still connected only to a small fraction of
the entire network; that is, the network is decentralized; 4) neighborhoods overlap;
i.e. the network is clustered.
To capture these characteristics Watts and Strogatz (1998) introduced a network
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regular lattice small world random graph fully connected
Figure 1: Network topologies (adapted from Watts and Strogatz (1998)).
model called a small world. It is an intermediate network between a regular lattice
network, where the agents (called nodes in the network literature) are connected
in a geometrically regular way, and a random graph, where the connections are
random. Social scientists have recognized that the small world network is a good
model approximating social interactions in real life. Networks with the small world
properties include social networks of the US corporate elite (Davis et al., 2003),
partnerships of investment banks in Canada (Baum et al., 2003), and many more.
Small world networks emerge when participating agents form networks through a
mix of random and strategic interactions (Baum et al., 2003 and Morone and Taylor,
2004).
Figure 1 shows four examples of network topologies. In the fully connected
network, all nodes are linked to all other nodes. In the regular lattice, each node
is connected to two nodes on each side, that is, each node has 4 connections, or
edges. In order to form a small world network an edge is reconnected to a dierent
randomly chosen node on the lattice (avoiding self- and double-connection) with a
given rewiring probability, 0 < p < 1. Such rewiring of the nodes continues until all
the edges are processed. In the limit when p = 1 the network becomes a random
graph.


























(b) N = 1000
Figure 2: Clustering coecient and characteristic path length for networks of dif-
ferent size. Note: logarithmic scale is used for abscissa.
the networks with two measures: a clustering coecient, C(p), and a characteristic
path length, L(p). The clustering coecient of a node is calculated by dividing
the number of edges between the node and its neighboring nodes by the maximum
possible number of edges between them. It indicates how well the neighborhood
of the node is connected or, in other words, it expresses the cliquishness of the
neighborhood. By averaging over the clustering coecients of all the nodes in a
network we obtain the clustering coecient of the network C(p). The characteristic
path length L(p) measures the average separation between two nodes and is dened as
the average number of edges in the shortest path between two nodes. This measure is
inversely related to the average speed of local signal transmission between two nodes
of the network. The shorter characteristic path length is, the faster the information
spreads through the network.
For each value of the rewiring probability p we obtain a network with new struc-
tural properties. These properties also depend on the number of nodes N. A small
world network can be dened in terms of the clustering coecient and characteris-
tic path length. Specically, it is a decentralized sparsely connected network with a
high clustering coecient C(p) and a small characteristic path length L(p). The val-
ues of the normalized clustering coecients and the characteristic path lengths for
8dierent rewiring probabilities p and two network sizes with N = 100 and N = 1000
nodes are depicted in Figure 2. Normalization is implemented over the correspond-
ing characteristics of the regular lattice (for which p = 0). The small world network
properties are observed for p = 0:1 when N = 100 and for 0:01 when N = 1000.
This is consistent with Albert and Barab asi (2002) who suggest that the rewiring
probability leading to a small world network is inversely proportional to the number
of nodes.
4 Heterogeneous belief model with local interactions
First, we briey describe the BH model which we modify to allow for local inter-
actions.1 There are two assets that are traded in discrete time: a risk-free asset
paying a constant gross return Rf = 1 + rf and a risky asset paying a stochastic
dividend yt at the beginning of each trading period t. The dividend is assumed
to be independently and identically normally distributed (i.i.d.) with mean  y and
variance Var[y]. The price pt per-share (ex-dividend) of the risky asset in period t is
obtained from the market clearing condition using a Walrasian auctioneer protocol.2
The wealth dynamics is:
Wt+1 = Rf(Wt   ptzt) + (pt+1 + yt+1)zt = RfWt + (pt+1 + yt+1   Rfpt)zt; (1)
where Wt and Wt+1 are the wealth levels in period t and t+1 correspondingly, and
zt is the number of shares of the risky asset purchased at date t.
1While the BH model is presented in terms of deviations from the fundamental price, we present
the model in terms of the price itself for better exposition.
2Following the common convention, in the previous section we used p to denote the rewiring
probability in a small world network. From now on p will denote price.







where a is the absolute risk aversion coecient, and Et and Vt denote conditional
expectation and conditional variance that are based on the publicly available infor-
mation set It = fpt;pt 1;pt 2;:::;yt;yt 1;yt 2;:::g. The demand for the risky asset













t are the expectations (or predictors) of the type h agent
about the mean and the variance, respectively. Note that we assume that all the
agent types expect the same variance, Vh
t = 2 .
Suppose that the supply of outside shares of the risky asset zs is constant. Let
nh
t be the fraction of type h agents at date t, and H be the number of trader types







t 1[pt+1 + yt+1]   Rfpt
a2 = zs: (4)
Under the assumption of zero total supply of the risky asset and homogeneous
(H = 1) beliefs of the agents, the fundamental price p is given by the discounted
sum of the expected future dividends as a solution to the market-clearing equation
(4), which is a well-known result. If, moreover, the dividend process is i.i.d. with
constant mean  y, then p =  y=rf.
We assume that there are two types of traders present in the market: fundamen-
talists and chartists. The fundamentalist traders forecast the next period price pt+1
10to equal the fundamental price p, that is:
E
f
t 1[pt+1 + yt+1] = p +  y: (5)
The chartists expect persistent deviations from the fundamental value of the price
in the following form:
Ec
t 1[pt+1 + yt+1] = p + g(pt 1   p) +  y; (6)
where a > 0 is a constant and g > 0 is an extrapolation parameter.
The belief types of agents are updated over time depending on the relative sat-










t is the observed performance measure, "h
t is the idiosyncratic noise (we
later discuss its source), and  is a coecient, which controls the intensity of the
noise. The observed performance measure Uh




t   Ch = (pt + yt   Rfpt 1)zt 1   Ch; (8)
where pt + yt   Rfpt 1 is the excess return earned per unit of the amount of the
risky asset zt 1 held in the agents' portfolio at the end of period t 1, and Ch is the
cost of following the strategy h. This cost is set to zero for the extrapolating rule of
chartists and is strictly positive (set to unity) for fundamentalists.
In the BH model, where every agent knows the performance of both strategies,














Figure 3: Dierent neighbor types.
type fractions nh
t and the market equilibrium price. For a suciently large number of
the agents, this fraction can be determined by nh
t = P(e Uh
t > e Uh 
t ), where P denotes
a probability measure. Moreover, if the idiosyncratic noise "h
t in (7) follows the
standard Gumbel (extreme value) distribution, by using the discrete choice model
of Manski and McFadden (1990), nh






t ) + exp(Uh 
t )
: (9)
In our setup the agents are located on the nodes of a network and can observe
the performance measure of the strategies employed only by those agents who reside
on the nodes directly connected with them. Hence, they cannot observe the strategy
performance of the traders located two or more edges away. Therefore, contrary to
Brock and Hommes (1998), we do not assume that the performance of every strategy
is available to all the agents and we do not use the discrete choice fractions specied
in (9). Instead, we allow only for local information exchange in the market. In
particular, if an agent is surrounded by the agents of the same type (see Figure
3a), she does not switch as there is no information about the performance of the
alternative strategy. If an agent has at least one neighbor of the dierent type3 (see
Figure 3b), she is able to compare the satisfaction from her own strategy e Uh
t with
the satisfaction from the alternative strategy e Uh 
t . She switches to the alternative
3If there are more than one neighbors of the dierent type, only one of them is consulted to
compare strategies.
12strategy if it performs better. Formally, an agent chooses a strategy h equal to
h = argmax
h;h (e Uh
t ; e Uh 
t ): (10)
We allow for idiosyncratic noise across the agents in the performance measure, as
specied by (7). The impact of the noise is inversely related to the intensity of the
choice parameter .
The noise in the performance measure may come from various sources. First,
investors' decisions may be inuenced by some unobserved factors in addition to the
performance measure. These factors may be attributed to the cultural and historical
characteristics (see Bond and Smith, 1996 and Hirshleifer, 2001) and dier across
investors and across time. Second, the noise may be attributed to communication.
We can distinguish two types of noise within this category. One type is attributed
to plain noisy information transmission, i.e. under- or over-reporting of prots by
neighbors due to behavioral biases. Another type of noise can be attributed to the
amount of trust the agents put into the results communicated by their neighbors.
We assume that the noise term "h
t in (7) is distributed according to the standard
Gumbel distribution. Under this assumption, our model with a fully connected
graph and a suciently large number of agents is comparable to the Brock and
Hommes (1998) model.
Our market constitutes a complex adaptive dynamical system with co-evolving
heterogeneous agents and equilibrium price. The model progresses in the following
way (see Figure 4). After the expectations of the agents are formed and their
demand is ascertained, the price is determined through the Walrasian auctioneer
scenario. Next, the prots of the agents are determined. Then, agents compare
their net prots with their neighbors' and switch to another strategy or remain with
their own depending on their spatial position and relative performance. Finally the
13agents form their expectations again and the cycle repeats.
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Figure 4: Temporal ow.
As we have discussed in Section 3, many
studies point out that small world networks
are good models for approximating real-life
local interactions. In the next section we
investigate the implications of introducing
small world information exchange into the
Brock and Hommes (1998) model. We also
compare the eect from the small world
network with other basic network topolo-
gies.
5 Simulations and results
By introducing nontrivial communication
structures into the Brock and Hommes
(1998) model we lose analytic tractabil-
ity. Nevertheless, complex behavior of the
resulting models can still be analyzed by
means of computer simulations.4
We conduct simulations for four dier-
ent network structures of local interactions, i.e. for a fully connected graph, a regular
lattice, a small world graph with the rewiring probability equal to 0:01, and a ran-
dom graph (see Figure 1). All the graphs are connected, that is, there are no nodes
that do not have any edges. The fully connected graph is used as a benchmark
corresponding to the nite number of agents implementation of the original Brock
4The C++ code for our simulations is partially adapted from the code of Bottazzi et al. (2005).
14Parameter Symbol Value/Range
Intensity of choice  [0:5;5]
Interest rate rf 0:1
Mean dividend  y 10
Interpolation coecient g 1:4
Initial price p0 103
Initial fraction of fundamentalists n
f
0 0:5
Number of agents N 1000
Transient period Tr 2000
Simulation length T 2000
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations.
and Hommes (1998) model. We analyze the asset price dynamics for N = 1000
agents. We found that for this number of agents fractions n
f
t are close to the corre-
sponding discrete choice probabilities in (9).5 For comparison we choose the basic
parameter values of the model similar to those used in Brock and Hommes (1998).
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
5.1 Evolution of prices and beliefs
The asset price dynamics for a range of values of  are shown by means of bifurcation
diagrams in Figure 5. These bifurcation diagrams depict the dependence of the price
distribution on the intensity of choice parameter . The price distribution for each
level of  is represented by a gray-shade histogram. Darker shades correspond to
areas of higher density. The histograms are computed using price levels from 10000
periods after 2000 transient periods with  ranging from 0:5 to 5 and a linear step
of 0:05.
The two bifurcations occurring in the fully connected network are similar to
the pitchfork and Neimark-Sacker bifurcations occurring in the Brock and Hommes
(1998) model for   2:3 and   3:3 respectively. During the pitchfork bifur-
5We also analyzed networks with N = 100. Qualitatively the results were similar. However, the
level of noise due to the nite sample implementation was much higher.
15Figure 5: Bifurcation diagrams.
cation, the steady state loses its stability and two additional stable steady states
are created. The Neimark-Sacker bifurcation leads to the emergence of periodic or
quasi-periodic cycles. Economic intuition behind these bifurcations is as follows.
The fundamentalists bring the price to the fundamental level, while the chartists
destabilize the fundamental price by extrapolating the trend. The dierence in the
fractions of these two types determines the price behavior. When the price is close
to the fundamental level the excess returns of the fundamentalists and the chartists
are equal, but the former incur the costs. When  <  this relative dierence in
past performance in not important for the choice of the forecasting rule. Thus, the
dierence in the fractions is not large enough and the price remains at the funda-
mental level. However, when  <  < , the relative past performance becomes
more important and a larger fraction of agents chooses the less costly chartist rule.
This results in the deviation of the equilibrium price from the fundamental level.
When  > , that is, when the agents become highly reactive to the dierence in
excess returns, we observe cyclical behavior. When the price is near the fundamental
16level, the fraction of chartists rapidly increases amplifying any small deviations from
the fundamental level and creating a bubble. The bubble ends since the extrapola-
tive behaviour of chartists is not strong enough to sustain the trend and at some
point fundamentalists start dominating the market bringing the price back to the
fundamental level and the story repeats itself.
The values of  for which two bifurcations occur in the fully connected network
are close to the BH model. The other networks show somewhat dierent dynamics.
The period between the primary and secondary bifurcations is shorter. In terms
of the occurrence of the primary bifurcation with respect to the parameter , the
networks can be arranged in the following order (in decreasing value of ): the fully
connected network (the benchmark), the random graph, the small world network,
and the regular lattice. The same order holds with respect to the increase in the
price amplitude. These results can be explained by the average speed of the infor-
mation transmission between the agents within the network, which is closely related
to the characteristic path length measure as discussed in Section 2. The informa-
tion about the performance of the alternative strategy reaches all the nodes in the
fully connected network within one time period. As we remove some edges, the
information transmission between the agents who are not directly connected slows
down. The speed of the information transmission is the slowest for the regular lat-
tice. Slower information transmission results in higher persistence of one particular
strategy over time, or, in other words, it delays the switching. Thus, the fraction of
chartists becomes relatively large for smaller values of  than in the fully connected
network. This translates into earlier bifurcations. The post-bifurcation region of
price instability becomes larger and the amplitude of price uctuations becomes
higher.
Figure 6 depicts the time series of the price for two values of the intensity of

































(b)  = 3:5
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(d)  = 3:5
Figure 6: Time series of price.
connected graph (FC), the regular lattice (RL), the small world network (SW) and
the random graph (RG). We use this abbreviation in subsequent gures. For  = 1
the price dynamics corresponding to the fully connected graph and the random
network converges to a steady state, while the regular lattice and the small world
network lead to highly irregular chaotic asset price uctuations. For  = 3:5, chaotic
behavior is observed for all the network topologies, however, the regularity and
the amplitudes of uctuations vary considerably among them. The price dynamics
of the random network are close to those of the fully connected network. The
price dynamics produced by the regular lattice are the most distinct from the fully
connected network. The small world network produces price dynamics similar to
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Figure 7: Evolution of agent population.
To provide insights into the eects of dierent network topologies on market
behavior we track how individual agents change their forecasting beliefs over time.
Figure 7 shows a typical set of patterns that emerge during simulations. This set
is for  = 3:5. The gure shows the evolution of the forecasting type for all 1000
agents at every time step from 0 to 1000. Each point on a vertical line represents
an agents' type: a black point indicates the fundamentalist type, while a blank (or
white) point indicates the chartist type. As reference points about the performance
of the alternative strategy, two agents in our system do not change their types: agent
500 is always a fundamentalist, while agent 0 is a chartist. This is done to prevent
the possible extinction of one of the agents' types, which may happen in our model
because of the nite number of agents. 6 The periods of the highest concentration
of fundamentalists correspond to the time when the price falls to the fundamental
level, while the lowest concentration of fundamentalists corresponds to the highest
deviation from the fundamental value of the price. Overall, the fraction of funda-
mentalists is higher in the fully connected network. This is consistent with smaller
deviations from the fundamental price and frequent price oscillations. Fundamen-
talist are uniformly distributed across the network. In the case of regular lattice
we observe high clustering of the fundamentalists around the fundamental \core".
6In the Brock and Hommes (1998) model the fractions of the both types are always positive,
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(d)  = 3:5
Figure 8: Time series of price with a stochastic dividend process.
This is consistent with the high clustering coecient of this network. In the small
world network we also observe clusters, but they are smaller and more disperse in
space. Again this is consistent with sparsity and a high clustering coecient typical
for this network. In the case of random graph we do not observe any clusters of the
fundamentalists. This is due to a very small clustering coecient for this network
and a relatively small number of the fundamentalists on the market during most of
the periods.
Figure 8 presents time series plots for the asset price corresponding to the case of
stochastic dividends. We assume that the dividends are independent and identically
normally distributed with the mean set to 10 and the variance of 1. For  = 1, even






























































(b) Average traded volume
Figure 9: Measures of market information ineciency.
network and the regular lattice exhibit large uctuation. For the fully connected
network and the random graph the price stays at the fundamental level of 100. For
 = 3:5, the regular lattice and the small world network produce even greater irregu-
lar single-peak deviations from the fundamental price, while the fully connected and
the random networks produce relatively regular uctuations of a much smaller scale.
A comparison of Figure 6 with Figure 8 suggests that the impact of the stochastic
dividend on the price is the strongest in the small world and the regular lattice
networks.
The informational eciency is closely related to the speed of information trans-
mission (or characteristic path length) and can be measured by comparing the
volatility of the observed price with the volatility of the fundamental dividend pro-
cess as suggested by Shiller (1981). In order to abstract from the eect of time-
varying dividend in our model, we keep the dividend process constant. Under this
assumption, the Ecient Market Hypothesis would predict constant price over time
and zero trading volume. In Figure 9 we analyze the standard deviation of the price
(panel a) and the average traded volume (panel b) for values of  ranging from 0.5 to
5 for the four topologies. We ignore the rst 2000 transitory iterations and compute




















































Figure 10: Skewness and kurtosis of returns.
periods. To eliminate the dependence of our results on a particular realization of the
random seed, we report averages for 100 simulation runs, each run having its own
random seed. The same simulation setup is used for all the other statistics reported
further. We observe that the random graph and the fully connected network exhibit
the most informational ecient outcomes for any values of  which is consistent with
the highest speed of information transmission in these two networks. The regular
lattice exhibits the least informationally ecient outcome.
5.2 Statistical properties
Below we analyze the properties of the time series generated by the four considered
networks. This analysis helps us to understand which network structure generates
the time series, properties of which are closer to the stylized facts observed in reality.
Figure 10 depicts the skewness of the returns and the excess kurtosis of the
returns. The former statistic (Figure 10a) measures the asymmetry of the distribu-
tion. It is close to zero for all the networks for all post-bifurcation values of . The
returns generated by the model with the small world network are slightly negatively
skewed.
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(b) Volume/volatility correlations
Figure 11: Properties of returns and volume.
return distributions with dierent kurtosis values. The small world network return
distribution exhibits the excess kurtosis value close to 5, which is close to the one
observed for the returns on the real nancial markets.
By computing the autocorrelation of the returns for the four network structures,
we can analyze linear unpredictability of the stock returns, which is a well-known
property of the time series exhibited by the real nancial markets. Figure 11a de-
picts the autocorrelation of returns for the rst ve lags as a function of the intensity
of choice. Usually the real nancial time series exhibit small or no autocorrelation
of returns. The regular lattice and the small world network produce high autocor-
relations at all lags. This, again, can be attributed to a less ecient information
transmission in these networks. Although the random graph and the fully connected
network display large autocorrelations at the rst two lags, they converge to zero
autocorrelation values at lag three to ve. The signicant positive autocorrelations
are resulting predominantly from the persistence of chartists strategies. It is possible
to reduce the autocorrelations by adding a sucient amount of dynamical noise into
the price as in Hommes (2002). However, we do not aim to reproduce stylized facts
in this paper and therefore do not pursue this route.
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Figure 12: Autocorrelation of squared returns.
of trades. In real nancial markets, high trade volumes are associated with high
volatility. Many standard asset pricing models, however, fail to reproduce this fact.
Our model produces positive volume-volatility correlations for all networks. The
highest values in the post-bifurcation region are observed under the random graph
network, followed by the small world network.
A universal property of the real nancial time series is the volatility clustering,
i.e., the presence of slow decaying autocorrelations in the squared returns. Figure
12a shows the autocorrelations of the squared returns at the rst ve lags as a
function of , while Figure 12b shows the autocorrelation function of the squared
returns for 20 lags with  = 3:5. The autocorrelations of the squared returns under
the fully connected network and random graph vanish after rst few lags, which is
not consistent with stylized facts. In turn the autocorrelations under the regular
lattice and the small world network remain positive and large at many lags for the
regular lattice and the small world network indicating the volatility clustering of the
returns.
The above analysis reveals that dierent local interaction arrangements in the
market aect the dynamics and the time series properties. The eect of the change
in the behavior parameter  also depends on a particular network conguration.
246 Concluding remarks
In this paper we expanded the model of Brock and Hommes (1998) by introducing
local information exchange via communication networks. We studied how dierent
network structures aect asset price dynamics. We observed that the stability region
with respect to the intensity of choice parameter  depends on the communication
network. A relatively slower information transmission in the regular lattice and the
small world networks creates greater information ineciencies and induces greater
instabilities and higher deviations in the price dynamics. Upon the analysis of the
statistical properties of the time series of the returns generated by dierent networks
we observed that the asset price dynamics generated under the small world network
exhibit some properties close to those observed in the real nancial markets.
In many networks there is a feedback between network performance and network
formation. This means that the performance of agents also inuences the network
topology they are active in. For simplicity in this work we imposed the network
structure on the agents. Endogenous network formation is an extension which we
plan to address in the future work.
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